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1. March 2005: Myself and my circumstances
This presentation intends to give an account of an experience on governmental 
initiative based on mechanisms of territorial governance and on the 
conviction of the power of dialogue, with the peculiarity of that account 
being realized by someone who had the political responsibility of conceiving 
and carrying it out. I am talking about the Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative1 
program and the role I played in it as Secretary of State for Cities and 
Spatial Planning.  
It is, therefore, a first-person narrative, an exercise which can be as interesting 
as ambiguous. Interesting, due to the fact that my direct participation on the 
multiple decision-making processes underlying the elaboration, approval 
and implementation of a complex public action allows me to reconstitute 
the dynamics and tensions which would be otherwise barely graspable by 
external observers; ambiguous, because any exercise of reconstitution of 
decision-making processes by those who had the political responsibility 
of coordinating them always bears the risk of some revisionism, albeit 
unconscious. Consequently, I shall endeavour to be “schizophrenically” 
rigorous, analysing and evaluating the Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative as if 
I was an external observer, but using information which could be accessed 
only by those directly involved.
Any political decision must be understood starting from contexts of 
asymmetrical relations of influence, power and trust in which the decision 
takes place. Hence, it is important to start by understanding my own 
position regarding those contexts in the moment of conception of the 
1 Abbreviated designation for the “Critical Neighborhoods Urban Qualification and Reinser-
tion Operations”.
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Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative program. I will do it through a SWOT 
analysis applied to myself: strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats of a government official with an academic origin and without 
political experience at the moment of his taking of office as Secretary of 
State for Cities and Spatial Planning, in 2005.                    
Let’s begin by the weaknesses: not being a member of the government 
political party and not having political experience. Those who are savvy 
about the political party corridors know that the status of independent 
and the academic provenance raise immediate suspicions to many of the 
party’s active members. Independent government officials with an academic 
provenance are considered unpredictable and exceedingly theoretical, almost 
always without any party-political capital to protect them, and generally 
faced as the frail sector of governments. Consequently, they are vulnerable 
and easily discarded in moments of crisis. As a matter of fact, any public 
initiative with notoriety by this kind of government officials is susceptible of 
being interpreted by some of his peers as a personal action pointed at media 
visibility or even as exhibitionism, carried out without regard for the tacit or 
formal rules governing the complex relations e hierarchies of power.      
But there were also strengths: technical-scientific credibility, based on a 
vast curriculum in the matters assigned that I was assigned to, and a good 
knowledge of administration, of its culture and of several of its leaders and 
technical personnel, in consequence of a long experience in consultancy 
provided to land-use planning public services. From this point of view, a 
strong social capital made up for a weak political capital.
In its turn, the area of Spatial Planning, my main context of action, was 
characterized by a set of well-known threats and opportunities. 
The main threat pertaining Spatial Planning was the structurally “weak” 
nature of the land-use policy in face of policies of a sectoral nature – 
transportation, economy, agriculture, environment, and so on – and the 
visions, interests and groups associated to those domains. Any relevant 
decision in matters of land-use policy will interfere with those visions, 
interests and groups. But also, and somewhat symmetrically, any profound 
change in the diverse sectoral policies will trigger land-use impacts, often 
with consequences that go against the principles and goals pursued by land-
use policy.   
The existing core opportunity at the time was derived from the generalized 
consensus regarding the necessity to overcome the limitations of a land-
use model considered by many as too rationalist, technocratic and 
bureaucratic. It is certain that this diagnostic, being relatively consensual, 
gave rise to diverse and even antagonistic reactions: what some envisaged 
as the necessity to pursue the same ends through different means, by 
adopting a more strategic, prospective and procedural vision, others found 
to be a pretext for the defence of a growing deregulation of land use, 
occupation and transformation, through a devaluation of the role played 
by the instruments of land-use management. But the idea that there was a 
paradigm of land-use whose potentialities seemed exhausted contributed 
to raise the awareness, by the multiple public and private agents, of the 
necessity of introducing changes in perspectives, procedures and practices. 
My academic provenance allowed me to transpose to the domain of public 
decision-making the debate, very much alive in several countries since the 
90’s, about the crisis of the “modern” rationalist model of land-use and the 
emergence of collaborative and participative planning, in which the concept 
of territorial based governance plays a central role [1].   
Therefore, this was my starting context, that is, the potential weaknesses and 
strengths of my personal characteristics and the threats and opportunities 
associated to the land-use domain. In short, myself and my circumstances in 
March 2005, the moment I took office as Secretary of State for Cities and 
Spatial Planning.    
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2. The Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative as policy project: options
In August 2005 – less than 5 months after my taking of office – the Critical 
Neighbourhoods Initiative program2 was approved at a meeting of the 
Council of Ministers [2]. The people directly involved in its preparation had 
a clear idea of what they wanted, especially my cabinet staff and the staff at 
the Institute for Housing and Urban Regeneration. Figure 1 presents the 
guidelines of this program.
First and foremost, the launching of a so-called Policy for the Cities was 
considered essential. Portugal had had several town planning programs, 
some of which with national provenance (for instance, Polis), and others 
with EU origin (Urban), but had never had a true Policy for the Cities, 
that is, an articulate and coherent set of institutional assignments and legal, 
financial and fiscal strategic tools that favoured a systemic vision of urban 
development for the whole country. The Policy for the Cities Polis XXI, as 
it was named at the time, was based on three pillars [3]. One of those pillars, 
of an intra-urban nature, amounted to integrated interventions in areas with 
specific characteristics. 
Secondly, there was reasonable knowledge regarding the several kinds of 
integrated urban interventions previously developed. There was awareness 
that their fulfilment e supervision had permitted an accumulation of an 
important set of knowledge and skills by a small, albeit significant, number 
of technicians. But we were also aware that those interventions had not fully 
achieved their goals. 
Thirdly, the national preparation for the financing programming cycle regard-
ing the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) 2007-2013 would 
start soon enough, which would allow the Policy for the Cities Polis XXI, 
conceived in the meantime, to be explicitly reflected in the NSRF document 
and thus be partially supported by the financial instruments contained by it.
2 Resolution of the Council of Ministers n. 143/2005, 7 September. Point 1 of this reso-
lution states: “The operations to develop intend to stimulate and put to test innovative 
institutional, procedural and technological solutions in terms of conception, implementa-
tion and assessment of public action in critical urban areas, and the gathered experience 
will be taken into account in the policy for the cities to be carried out”.
Therefore, the favourable conditions were established in order to formulate a 
policy for the cities that could benefit from the strategic and programmatic 
framework of the NSRF. But it was clear that such policy justified the 
development of an experimental program which could mobilize the 
memories associated with previous experiences, relatively scattered and 
endangered by forgetfulness, and which anticipated, at the same time, the 
rules that would be enforced during the 2007-2013 timeframe. 
The goal was that the people involved in the experimental program acquired 
or reinforced the knowledge, skills and relationships needed for the 
successful development of the integrated urban interventions that would 
be supported in the scope of the NSRF and that others would find in the 
program a relevant reference for action. The launching of an experimental 
program in this domain and in these conditions envisaged, therefore, a 
threefold goal: to mobilize and revitalize already existent skills; to widen 
– through the participation of a wider and more diversified range of actors 
– and to deepen – through the increase of the intervention domains – those 
skills around a restrict number of integrated urban interventions; and to 
produce a reference for action for future participants in integrated urban 
development interventions. 
Critical Neighborhoods Initiative Program Guidelines 
“The intervention programs in each neighborhood should respond to immediate prob-
lems and, at the same time, stimulate the creation of new opportunities based on existing 
potentialities, through solutions developed according to the following guiding principles:
a) Exemplary, innovative and experimental nature of the interventions to be achieved;
b) Viable mobilizing projects; each intervention should include an action/project 
with high potential of mobilization of the neighborhood inhabitants and high 
potential of transformation of the neighborhoods structural conditions; 
c) Focus on housing rehabilitation and qualification, in regards to urban develop-
ment and to the environment; 
d) Strategic coordination and civic participation as conditions for success;
e) New resources exploration and mobilization of new financing sources as a sustain-
ability factor;
f ) Added value and durability of outcomes and effects.”
Figure 1. Critical Neighborhoods Initiative Program Guidelines [2].
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On the other hand, there was awareness that the members of a government 
which found itself at the beginning of a new political cycle, the product 
of the political party alternation logic, would be more open to a not only 
reformist, but also inter-ministerial cooperation stance, a decisive aspect of 
interventions that, based on territory, would have to involve domains under 
the tutelage of different ministries.  
There was also awareness that this type of initiative, although experimental 
and involving a limited number of interventions, would be confronted with 
difficulties. The informal conversations that had taken place until then 
with central and local administration leaders and technicians emphasized 
a recurrent set of obstacles to the development of integrated urban 
interventions that could not be underestimated. 
The referred difficulties were of institutional, social and financial nature. The 
first ones seemed to me the most important at the time. The issues raised in 
this domain regarded mainly two aspects: the effective degree of dedication and 
commitment of the various partners involved in the same intervention and the 
evolution of the relationship dynamics along the intervention processes.  
The first aspect, regarding the degree of dedication and commitment of 
each of the partners involved, is particularly decisive. The initial enthusiasm 
could not give place to disenchantment and to progressive withdrawal; 
voluntarism could not mean a forced presence of sceptical or even critical 
partners; the conditions created could not give rise to tactical or even 
opportunistic approximations. But, at the same time, the key agents for 
change in the intervention areas could not be left out. Between allies – 
whom we needed to identify and to secure their loyalty –, sceptics – whom 
we needed to convince –, and disbelievers – whom we needed to attract or, 
at least, prevent from transforming into difficult obstacles to surmount – 
there was a complex process of clarification, persuasion and involvement, 
based on the ingredients present in any politics manual on soft power, from 
argumentative capacity to the creation of personal empathy relations, from 
the strict respect for each one’s competences to the creation of more or less 
subtle situations of complicity.    
If these are the general rules, the truth is that their management became 
particularly complex in an intervention which presupposed intense relations 
between different ministries, central administrations entities (concentrated 
and deconcentrated), municipalities, and also non-governmental 
organizations with presence in the intervention areas. The involvement 
of eight ministries, the existence of a centralized and sectorialized 
administration, the (normal) existence of political agendas and timings 
of their own by the municipalities, and also situations of greater or lesser 
tension e conflict extant in any intervention area allowed to foresee that the 
survival of initial dedication and commitment implied the construction of 
processes of reciprocal knowledge and trust in the context of an adequate 
management model and the joint elaboration of a common strategy.    
Regarding the relations inside the government, the fundamental 
preoccupation was to create relations of a complementary nature and 
synergies that were not perceived as abusive intromissions in domains under 
the tutelage of other ministries. That stance was generically understood, but 
with distinct degrees and timings of acceptance.  
Concerning the relations with central administration services, the main 
issue – truth be told, never solved – was to guarantee that the representatives 
of the various ministries intervened effectively in that condition and not 
individually, that is, that their positions translated – or were translated to 
– the practices of the services to which they belonged. However, that was 
not always the tendency, with the result that some of the entities formally 
integrated in the execution of the program never felt bound in relation to 
the decisions being made.   
The relation with the administration services under my tutelage raised a different 
problem. Is this case, to someone coming from a academic career and, for that 
reason, with specific knowledge about the matters being discussed, the question 
was to try to disassociate the technical issues – a prerogative of the services 
decision-making – from the political issues – my responsibility. That dissociation 
effort was as important as I was aware that an excessive intervention on entities 
under my tutelage in meetings that counted on the presence of services from 
other ministries would always be interpreted by the representatives of the latter 
as a disempowerment of leaders that I had chosen myself. 
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The relation with the municipalities was a peculiar one and, in a sense, 
the most fascinating, for it put face to face political decision-makers with 
the same democratic legitimacy, but with visions and priorities which did 
not necessarily coincide. On the other hand, I was aware that not only 
the majority of the program’s intervention domains was under municipal 
tutelage, but also that the involvement of municipalities in complex 
participatory processes always created some level of discomfort, or even 
raise disagreement, in some mayors.    
Lastly, the relation with non-governmental organizations was less intense 
and continuous. Moreover, that relationship raised some issues different 
from the previous, particularly in regards to the necessity of a treatment that 
could not be interpreted locally as privileging some entities in detriment of 
others, nourishing local stories of tensions and conflict that had nothing to 
do with the Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative, but which could endanger a 
good pursuance of the interventions to be developed in those areas.        
The answer to this set of difficulties was conceived out of three components: 
scope (focus); processes (inclusion and trust); and critical monitoring 
(knowledge). 
The first concern justified the option for a rather restricted number 
of interventions, but nonetheless with some geographical and party 
representativeness. Three areas were chosen, one in Oporto (Bairro do 
Lagarteiro) and two others in Lisbon’s metropolitan area (Cova da Moura, 
Amadora municipality, and Vale de Amoreira, Moita municipality), with 
leaderships divided between the three political parties with higher expression 
at the local government’s level. The selection of a small, but rather diversified 
number of intervention areas intended to conciliate the experimental nature 
of the Initiative with the existence of distinct contexts of action.    
The second concern pertained the necessity of building inclusive processes, 
based on relations of trust. For that reason, a great centrality was assigned 
to the participatory, collaborative and deliberative processes involving the 
various partners of each of the interventions. These processes were developed 
having three framing elements as reference:   
•	 A partnership protocol for intervention area, which envisaged to 
grant transparency to the pursued goals and to establish a public and 
lasting commitment between the various partners subscribing the 
operation;
•	 An Intervention Plan for each of the areas, conceived during a period 
of nine months with the participation not only of the partners, but 
also of local populations, envisaging the collaborative production of 
an agenda for common intervention;
•	 A multilevel Governance Model (inter-ministerial working group, 
executive commission, local monitoring committees and technical 
groups of the project), envisaging the assurance of good conditions of 
communication, dialogue, articulation and institutional coordination 
during the several stages of the interventions [4].
Finally, there was the concern of monitoring the program’s execution out of a 
solid knowledge about this kind of operations, taking place both in Portugal 
and in other countries, involving a group of specialists whose mission was to 
critically monitor the evolution of the interventions in their many components. 
Given the identified obstacles and the expected difficulties, this was the 
response found to adaptively manage the evolution of the interventions. The 
choice made followed the conviction that the fulfilment of adequate forms 
of territorial governance is essential for the development of integrated urban 
interventions based in a perspective of inclusion, learning, capacity building 
and empowerment, institutionally as well as individually. 
3. The Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative as praxis: tensions
This presentation does not intend to carry out a balance of the interventions 
developed in the scope of the Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative program. But 
it will be useful to express, being politically responsible for this program’s 
conception, a personal interpretation of the main tensions present during the 
first years of its execution. Truth be told, the way the program was conceived 
and developed contained six tensions whose meaning and implications is 
important to understand and consider. 
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The first tension stems from the nature of the program: does it make 
sense to centrally develop, by governmental initiative (top-down logic), an 
experimental program based on local mobilization and participation, and in 
collaborative and horizontal forms of deliberation (bottom-up logic)?   
The second tension concerns the program’s ambition: does it make sense to 
try to coordinate agents, values, interests, powers and capabilities so different 
in contexts marked by a persistent culture of institutional fragmentation 
and by the occurrence of sometimes significant conflicts between entities 
and groups of a same area?    
The third tension pertains to the execution conditions of the interventions: is 
it possible to fulfil actions which presuppose processes of social innovation, 
demanding in terms of learning and capacity building and, therefore, in 
terms of time, in the context of interventions with relatively short deadlines 
and tightly defined calendars?
The fourth tension refers back to the skills to be mobilized: is it possible 
to ensure, in the middle of one and the same intervention and in view 
of the human and financial resources available at the partnering entities, 
technical skills (mostly of on a basis of areas of study: economy, engineering, 
architecture, sociology, geography, psychology, etc.) and general skills 
(conflict management, mediation, facilitation and consensus-building)?  
The fifth tension regards the kind of results to value: does it make sense to 
value the quality of the participation, dialogue and coordination processes in 
detriment of the results obtained (institutional vision of learning, capacity 
building and empowerment), or, inversely, to assign priority to the tangible 
results obtained in disregard of the quality of the underlying processes 
(intervention efficacy vision)?  
Finally, the sixth tension emphasizes the issue of the stability of the 
interventions: is the complexity of the interventions an inevitable source 
of disruption, in the extent that it increases the degree of exposition and 
sensitivity to unpredictable circumstances, worsening its vulnerability and 
increasing the possibilities of failure? 
These tensions are present in the Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative program, 
not in an unexpected way, but in a structural fashion, in the extent that they 
are part of the program’s conception itself. The issue is, therefore, to know 
how to manage them and what are the minimal indispensable conditions 
(institutional, social, financial, etc.) which is necessary to ensure in order to 
give meaning and feasibility to the action programs built in a participatory 
and collaborative fashion.
4. The Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative as political experience: illations
Initially, the Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative program was conceived with 
a limited time span in mind (2005-2007), given its experimental nature 
and the intention of constituting a reference for action for integrated urban 
interventions to be supported in the scope of the NSRF programming for 
2007-2013. Due to delays motivated by factors of various order, the deadline 
was extended later on until 2013. Remaining in office until October 2009, 
I held the political responsibility for the program during a period which 
roughly coincided with the first four years of its execution. 
From its beginning, the Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative was subjected 
to several assessments by independent national and foreign entities. On 
the other hand, its context of application changed, in accordance with the 
political guidelines adopted since 2009 (XVIII constitutional government) 
and, most of all, 2011 (XIX government).  
It is not my task to carry out an evaluation of the current situation of the 
interventions developed at Bairro do Lagarteiro, Cova da Moura and Vale de 
Amoreira: I don’t possess the required information nor is this the appropriate 
place to perform such task. But I would like to finish this presentation 
with some remarks, considering the curious paradox which consists in 
this program’s abandonment by government officials coinciding with a 
proposal, presented by the European Commission for the next community 
programming cycle 2014-2020, of integrated territorial development 
instruments based exactly on the kind of philosophy which underlies the 
Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative.    
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Any appraisal of the Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative program cannot be 
polarized between the enchantment of those who conceived it politically 
and technically and who contributed to it with energy and tremendous 
commitment, in its diverse and eventful stages of execution, the 
disappointment of those whose expectations built in the meantime were let 
down, and the criticism of those who limited themselves to underscoring 
that the proposed goals were not fully accomplished. Between alluring 
enchantment, demobilizing disappointment and crushing criticism there is 
an immense room for analysis, assessment and learning. 
From a more technical point of view, we would have to go further: to perform 
a counterfactual assessment, that allowed the identification of the value, 
tangible and intangible, created by the interventions and, as a counterpoint, 
to estimate the costs of inaction for the communities at stake, in social, 
economic and financial terms, resulting from the program’s inexistence. It 
would be important, also, to clearly differentiate the results, impacts and 
effects of the interventions, taking into account the fact that these make 
themselves felt over the course of time. Lastly, it would be justified to 
conduct a study on the social construction of the processes of perception 
and change and innovation awareness by the partners involved and by local 
communities which took place at the intervention areas.
The Critical Neighbourhoods Initiative program puts at the core of its 
existence the mechanisms of territorial governance and the advantages 
and power of dialogue. But its history, on its own, does not possess enough 
strength or representativeness to confirm or disprove the validity of the 
assumptions adopted. Furthermore, the theoretical debate on the efficiency 
of governance mechanisms as an instrument for application of public policy 
is not itself conclusive. Believers, sceptics and critics evoke arguments 
which suggest they are right. Such distinct and even contradictory results 
and appraisals demand prudence as to emitting any definite opinion. But 
that does not prevent us from identifying the focus of the question to be 
clarified: what are the political, institutional, cultural, and social conditions 
capable of stimulating ways of territorial governance which, being based 
on participation, on collaboration between different entities, and on 
institutional coordination, will allow to achieve results that would not be 
achievable otherwise? 
The answer to the question laid out demands that a voice be given to 
the several leading figures of this kind of interventions: national and 
local political leaders, central and local administration technicians, non-
governmental organization’s leaders and associates, business companies, 
and, of course, citizens. They will all have their personal reports, built out 
of a significant diversity of goals, expectations and experiences. It is that 
polyhedron of testimonies that we must come to know and understand.                
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